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Abstract:

Platform data has already become an important asset for web-based
companies, but this sort of data frequently includes large amounts of
personal information. Platform data can be seen as belonging to an
individual, belonging to a platform, belonging to some combinations of
the two, or can be seen as a form of Internet-based public data. Analysis
of legal clauses and doctrines as well as analysis based in legitimacy and
consequentialism both fail to completely delineate data ownership. One
potential reason for this is that there are many types of platform data, and
that each type is highly dependent on circumstances. The determination
of rights in regard to platform data should be done in a way which revolves
around a contextual regulatory framework, one in which the rules of
reason is applied on a case-by-case basis and in which gradual changes
are done in a bottom-up manner, and not one which seeks to establish
a universal set of data regulations. In actual judgments, factors such as
the nature of the platform and the nature of the data crawling behavior
should be comprehensively considered while ensuring a balance of data
circulation and data protection.
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D

ata plays a crucial role in the development of web-based companies. The more users
an Internet company and/or platform have, the more users it can attract, and the more
advantageous a position the company will have in its competition with other web-based companies.
This snowball-like growth effect means that web-based companies often treat data as a central
competitive asset (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, p. 424; Lemley & McGowan, 1998, p. 479). Whichever
Internet company can possess the most data and utilize such data in the most effective way will
possess a competitive advantage.
Perhaps because of data’s importance, there has recently been a slew of disputes involving it.
Some examples of this are Huawei and Tencent’s data dispute, the disagreement between Shunfeng
and Cainiao, the case of Sina vs. Maimai, the case of Dianping vs. Baidu, the unfair competition
dispute brought by Taobao against Meijing, the case of Craiglist vs. 3Taps in the United States, and
the case of HiQ vs. LinkedIn. In all of these cases, the central question at hand is data, namely, when
a web platform acquires data from another platform through technical means, is that behavior legal or
reasonable? Or, in simpler terms: exactly to whom does a platform’s data belong? ①
There have already been a large number of researches done on this question within legal
academia, but researches have tended to look at questiones from the perspective of departmental law
and, accordingly, many researches done have focused on the issue in this context. For instance, some
scholars have analyzed the legality of data crawlers from the angle of the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Zhang, 2013, pp. 46-51; Ning & Wang, 2016, pp. 161-168; Fan,
2015, pp. 84-94; Yang & Qu, 2013, pp. 30-34; Yang, 2014, pp. 12-21; Fan, 2015, pp. 84-94; Liu, 2018,
pp. 26-30), some scholars have analyzed corporate data property right protection from the perspective
of civil property rights (Long, 2017, p. 75; Long, 2018, p. 50), and other scholars have analyzed
corporate data protection from the perspective of intellectual property law (Xu, 2018, p. 56). Although
this type of research has provided valuable insights into the question of data ownership, it has failed
to examine the question of data ownership from a comprehensive perspective, especially in regard to
platform data issues (Yao, 2019, pp. 114-125; Hu, 2017, pp. 1-14). ② Furthermore, although economic
literature has increasingly recognized data ownership issues and provided helpful knowledge for their
analysis (Fei, 2018, pp. 3-21; Du, 2018, pp. 19-25; Wang, 2015, pp. 131-135), data ownership issues
are still not a purely economic question, and their legitimacy cannot be solely established on the
foundation of pure efficiency analysis. For instance, from the sole perspective of efficiency, platform
ownership of data is the most efficient because the centralized application of data on a large scale
can efficiently resolve the externality and exchange costs produced by data. This sort of cursory
analysis, however, does not consider the issue in the context of personal privacy and data circulation
in larger-scale public domains. One extreme example of these shortcomings is that from the economic
perspective, a platform could utilize private personal data to incentivize or even threaten individual
① In the ten questions raised by Ailbaba’s Luohan Academy in June 2019, one of the questions “To whom do data belong? Who really benefits from them?” See
Alibaba’s Luohan Academy Raises 10 of the Most Important Questions for the Future of the World and Scholars’ Response.
② The two scholars Yao Jia and Hu Ling considered the corporate data ownership issue from the perspective of data use and business models.
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labor, with the result of increasing efficiency. This sort of system, however, evidently may not be
rational. ① Therefore, although economic literature has provided beneficial analysis of platform data
ownership questions, this sort of research can only form one part of a more comprehensive analysis.
Based on these considerations, I conducted comparatively comprehensive researches on
platform data ownership to examine the issue of platform data ownership by looking at the typical
technique of web crawling in data disputes. Web-crawling refers to a method by which information
is automatically collected through a code or script in the worldwide web according to a certain set
of rules. Throughout the development of the Internet, both web crawlers and anti-web crawlers have
become extremely common and because of their ubiquitous use, I have analyzed the issue of data
ownership and data protection from the perspective of web-crawling.
Let me be blunt, there is no clear way to determine the ownership of platform data. Platform
data can include various types of data, including large amounts of personal data, in regard to which
individuals possess relevant privacy rights. Platform data are also collected by corporations, and these
corporations have related rights and interests in regard to this data. Platform data can also be part of
the public domain, where neither an individual nor a corporation possess exclusive rights to it. Besides
this, the nature of platform data is also highly dependent on context. Based on these characteristics, I
believe that contextual protection should be applied to platform data, and that whether it be individual
or corporate data, regulations should be determined in a bottom-up manner, on a case by case basis.
In the consideration of each case, one must consider the nature of the platform, the nature of the data,
and the nature of the web-crawlers in order to ensure the proper balance of data privacy protection,
the protection of corporate data rights and interests, and data access.

Web Crawling and Data Disputes
Search engines such as Google, Baidu, Sougou, and Bing, the context in which web-crawling
techniques were first applied, remain the most common context in which such technology has been
utilized. As far as search engines themselves are concerned, the use of such search engines by webcrawling technology is a process from which all participants benefit. The search engine is able to
realize its potential to efficiently collect and sort information while the web pages that are crawled are
more widely disseminated through the search engine.
Despite this, parties who do not want their data to be crawled quickly emerged. Internet-based
companies gradually developed two applied methods to counter web-crawling. The first method was
the development of a gentlemen’s agreement: The Robots Exclusion Standard (also Robots Exclusion
Standard or Robots Exclusion Protocol), which gave rise to a set of documents called the robot.txt file

① In the field of economics, a Russian economist once gave an example of this. If land ownership is allocated to the landlord and the landlord guarantees a
particular level of hunger among the peasants, then from the perspective of efficiency, this would be beneficial to the maximum use of the land, because
peasants will work tirelessly, but this sort of system obviously lacks legitimacy. See (Russian) Chayanov: Peasant Economic Organization, Zhenghong Xiao,
Guanze Chenyue, Zhongyang Bianyi Publisher 1996 Edition.
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developed by website owners. This file was placed in the root directory of a given website’s server
and indicated which webpages in the directory were not allowed to be seized through crawling.
Friendly crawlers would often first read the robot.txt file before collecting information from a website
and subsequently refrain from downloading the web page which has been restricted in the file. The
second method developed by web company employees was a technical approach to countering webcrawling, in which various technical changes were implemented in order to prevent web-crawlers
from visiting the page. An example of this is that one can configure a website to require a visitor to
input a password if the page is accessed too quickly, thereby excluding non-human page visits.
Another example of this is that a website can change its HTML tags from time to time, to make it
impossible for web crawlers to match the structure of the webpage.
During this period in which web-based companies were taking part in both web-crawling and
methods to counter them, legal disputes revolving around data began to emerge. In 2000, a company
named Bidder’s Edge carried out a web-crawling operation on eBay’s website. eBay filed claims in
the Northern California court system, alleging that Bidder’s web crawling activities on eBay’s site
went against their Robots Exclusion Standard, in which their behaviors constituted a trespass against
eBay and an instance of computer fraud and misuse, and finally violated the Anti-Unfair Competition
Law of the People’s Republic of China. In the end, the court found Bidder’s Edge responsible for the
charge of trespass, believing that the defendant had not received authorization to interfere with the
plaintiff’s ownership rights in regard to information stored on the computer, and that the behavior
directly harmed the plaintiff.
In this case, one of the defenses that Bidder’s Edge proposed was that because all of the
information on eBay’s website was publicly available, there had been no trespass. In response to this,
the court’s opinion was that eBay’s server was private property, and that the public right to access it
had to be granted by the company. eBay did not typically allow web crawlers to access the site, and in
this case, eBay explicitly told Bidder’s Edge that it was not allowed to use robots to crawl eBay’s site.
Therefore, there was trespass present in this case.
In regard to the right to access webpages, the reasoning behind the judgments made in Chinese
cases has been relatively consistent with the reasoning in the eBay case. For instance, in Sina vs.
Maimai and Dianping vs. Baidu, the courts held that web-crawling without permission and the
collection of large amounts of data from the other party’s website constituted illegal behaviors. In
these cases, courts commonly referred to the regulations within the Anti-Unfair Competition Law
of the People’s Republic of China, finding that this sort of behavior “disrupts the order of market
competition and harms the legal rights of other operators and consumers,” and, therefore, is in
violation of the second article of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China,
which states that “Businesses shall, in their production and distribution activities, adhere to the free
will, equality, fairness, and good faith principles, and abide by laws and business ethics.”
Of course, there have also been cases with different reasoning behind their judgments. In HiQ
vs. LinkedIn, HiQ took measures to crawl LinkedIn’s website, but a judge of the the United States
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District Court for the Northern District of California held that this behavior was not in violation of
the law because the data on LinkedIn’s site is public data, and that even if the behavior violated the
Robots Exclusion Standard set up by LinkedIn, it was still permitted by the law. The behavior was
akin to pushing open a store’s unlocked door in broad daylight and having a look inside, in no way
could it be considered illegal trespass. Based on this, the court did not find HiQ’s web-crawling
behavior in violation of the law but in fact found LinkedIn’s counter-web-crawling technology illegal
and required LinkedIn to remove barriers to access it had instated against HiQ.
One thing that makes data disputes that arise from web-crawling even more complicated is the
fact that website data often originates from individuals, meaning that there are data privacy issues
associated with such behavior. One example of this is that in the aforementioned Sina vs. Maimai
case, Sina accused Maimai not only of violating the company’s Robots Exclusion Standard, but also
asserted that Maimai’s web-crawling had not received the authorization of users. In the case of HiQ
vs. LinkedIn, LinkedIn also brought up the issue of data privacy protection and asserted that HiQ’s
crawling activities against LinkedIn would impact such protections. In regard to the question of
whether collecting data from online platforms requires individual authorization, the courts have given
different judgments. For instance, in HiQ vs. LinkedIn, the court held that crawling would in no way
influence the protection of citizens’ privacy, but in Sina vs Maimai the court clarified the necessity of
user authorization outside of platform authorization.
In the web-crawling and data dispute between Jinri Toutiao and Weibo, Jinri Toutiao emphasized
that users have rights to personal data. Weibo believed that its data were illegally crawled by Jinri
Toutiao,① but Jinri Toutiao believed that this sort of data belonged to the user but not to Weibo, and
that as long as a site has user authorization, it could legitimately carry out web-crawling. Jinri Toutiao
believed that its web-crawling behavior was not in violation of the law because the app’s front page
had an option inviting user authorization, and it was only after users enabled this option authorizing
Jinri Toutiao to seize the user’s Weibo data that the crawling occurred. This function allowed users
to automatically post the information posted on Weibo on Toutiao’s “Mini-Toutiao” product for a set
time period.

Four Views Concerning Data Ownership
We can now proceed to summarize views on data ownership. With regard to platforms with large
amounts of personal data, we can largely categorize views on data ownership into four categories.
Individual Ownership of Data
This view of data ownership is that data belongs to the individual user. In the dispute

① In Weibo’s view, “a certain third-party news platform directly seizes content from individual media accounts without the acknowledgment or authorization of
Weibo”.
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between Jinri Toutiao and Weibo, Jinri Toutiao’s position is a classic example of this point of
view. Jinri Toutiao believed that Weibo had no right whatsoever to user data and that therefore,
as long as web-crawling was authorized by the user, even if Toutiao violated Weibo’s Robots
Exclusion Standard, the behavior would not be in violation of the law. Weibo can, of course,
choose to bring suits against users, especially against large, high-profile users for violating
their agreements with the company as the company’s user agreement clearly states that Weibo
enjoys the exclusive right to user content, and many of these high-profile users have signed very
clear contracts. This way, whenever users, especially high-profile users, post content on Weibo
and authorize Jinri Toutiao to use that content, Weibo can sue those users and require courts to
find this behavior in violation of the law. Even if courts were to find such behavior illegal, Jinri
Toutiao can claim that its behavior is not illegal and that although the user behavior is illegal, it
has nothing to do with Jinri Toutiao.
In reality, if individual ownership of user data was strengthened and the right to personal data
was viewed as a right of publicity but not as a right to property, or if the right to ownership was seen
as a legally established consumer right (Ding, 2018, pp. 45-50), then Weibo’s user agreement would
probably be rendered null and void from the outset. Once individual ownership of data is viewed as
an untransferable right of publicity, it follows naturally that data collectors and users cannot limit the
free exercise of this right to data. Just as private individuals cannot limit a citizen from freely using
their own name through a contract (Hansmann & Kraakamn, 2002, pp. 368-387), corporations would
be unable to require individuals to forfeit their rights to data through such contractual means.
The right to data portability recently established by the EU can be viewed as another
manifestation of this sort of individual right to data. If the right to data portability established by the
“General Data Protection Regulation” (GDPR) is recognized, it follows that platforms not only cannot
limit personal data, but additionally must provide assistance to ensure the free circulation of personal
data. The GDPR stipulates that “the data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data
concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used,
and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without
hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided.” According to this data
right, users would even be able to require Weibo to make itself more open to other platforms, so that
the free circulation of their data could be achieved.
Platform Ownership of Data
The second view of data ownership is that data belongs to the platform. The most typical version
of this view is encapsulated in the new user agreement Weibo put out in the aftermath of the breakout
of its dispute with Jinri Toutiao. This agreement stipulated that “Regarding information uploaded
on Weibo by users, including but not limited to text, pictures, video, audio, no matter if the Weibo
content can be established as a protected object under copyright law, users agree that they cannot
rescind the Weibo platform’s exclusive right to post Weibo content, and that the Weibo content posted
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by users can be exclusively displayed on the Weibo platform.” ① This new user agreement in essence
defined data as belonging to the platform and eliminated user’s right to authorize the use of Weibo
content.
As can likely be imagined, the idea that data belongs solely to the platform is not well received by
most. After Weibo released this new user agreement, it was met with fierce resistance and criticism
from users and media alike, resulting in Weibo clarifying the agreement and eventually amending
it. This newer user agreement stipulated that users have copyright over content posted on Weibo,
and that as a posting platform Weibo only enjoys a limited right of use over such content. Users can
distribute content to which they have the complete right to other platforms according to their own
wishes, with no need to receive Weibo’s approval, examination, or agreement. Notwithstanding this
however, the post-update user agreement still emphasized that individually authorizing, permitting,
or assisting a third party in illegally seizing content already distributed on Weibo without Weibo’s
approval is still illegal. Therefore, the adjusted user agreement means that while Weibo does not have
a relative right to data relative to users, it does enjoy a relative right to data relative to other platforms.
Combined Ownership of Data by Both Individuals and Platforms
The third view of data ownership is that it is owned by both individuals and platforms. This view
is commonly expressed in the judgments of Chinese courts. For instance, in the case of Sina vs.
Maimai the court held that the premise of data openness must be authorized by both the individual
user and the platform. In addition to this, in order to emphasize the importance of personal data
protection the court also proposed the “threefold authorization” model of “user authorization” +
“platform authorization” + “user authorization” which entails that the data provider must receive
user approval before collecting data, and that when the data provider authorizes a third party to use
this sort of information, the third party platform must clearly notify the user of the goal, manner, and
scope of the information’s use, and once again receive the user’s approval. The line of reasoning held
within this judgment by the courts means that users and platforms both maintain a certain right to
data, and that data are to a certain extent commonly owned by both the individual and the platform.
Of course, within the framework of combined ownership of data by individuals and platforms,
the delineation of this right between both parties is still an issue. In the case of a web platform in
competition with a given platform undertaking web-crawling, twofold and threefold authorization
regulations are quite sensible and would be realistically implementable. In other contexts, however,
requiring platforms and individuals to go through twofold or threefold authorization is likely to result
in all sorts of challenges. For instance, when a user copies and pastes large amounts of data from
one platform to another platform, this behavior obviously has not received the authorization of the

① This user agreement at the same time stipulated that “without the prior written permission of Weibo, the user must not authorize any third-party platform in
any way to directly or indirectly use Weibo content, including but not limited to authorizing any third-party to post, copy, transfer, edit, quote, link, download,
synchronize, or in any other way use a part or the whole of any Weibo content, nor should the user themselves do anything listed above.”
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platform, but does this sort of behaviors violate the commonly held data property right? Besides this,
when the right to ownership of a platform’s website is transferred to another party, does this property
transfer need to obtain approval from users? In 2018, Renren Network was sold to Duoniu Media
company, and the property in this sale included user data. Throughout the entire process of the sale
however, Renren Network never went through a phase of obtaining user approval. Undoubtedly,
requiring Renren Network to obtain the approval of all its users before the sale would not have been
realistic.
Public Ownership of Data
The fourth view of data ownership is that data is publicly owned. This view holds that once a
platform involves the Internet, the platform’s data possesses a public nature and is not owned by any
individual or corporation. In the case of HiQ vs. LinkedIn, HiQ hired professor Laurence Tribe from
Harvard Law School as an advisor, with Tribe believing that the right to access data and information
is akin to the right to free speech, which is protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and with the essence of speech being its capacity to be circulated and shared, that right possesses
a public character. Therefore, seizing data does not require the authorization by the platform or the
individual.①
Professor Orin Kerr, an Internet law scholar, once typified the public nature of the Internet. In his
view, the general principle of the Internet is its openness. Thus, this sort of openness allows anyone
from around the world to distribute information and data, and data can be accessed by anyone without
undergoing identity verification. When a computer owner decides to set up a web server on their
device and allow documents to be accessible through the web, it is presumed that the documents can
be accessed by everyone (Kerr, 2016, pp. 1143, 1163). Professor Kerr also drew an analogy, stating
that connecting a server to the Internet is akin to putting a product up for sale at a public trade fair,
anyone can access data on the web just as anyone can access the product at the trade fair (Kerr, 2016, p.
1163). It is only in special circumstances, such as when a webpage sets up a password, that a webpage
changes from an open webpage to a closed webpage (Kerr, 2016, p. 1161).
The Chinese web commentator Fang Xingdong has expressed similar views. Fang believes that
from the earliest incarnation of the Internet, ARPAnet, to the later TCP/IP agreements, in addition to
a series of Internet regulation mechanisms and technical standards organizations, it has been “firmly
established that the core values and technical regulations of the Internet are openness, accessibility,
freedom, and equality” as well as “connection without discrimination, selection, or conditions,” but
currently the Chinese Internet industry has been increasingly undertaking a “high-wall” approach to
data and site traffic. Therefore, Fang believes that whether it was Taobao refusing to allow Baidu to
search stored page information, the “3B conflict” in which Baidu is attempting to refuse to allow 360

① Tribe points out that LinkedIn and Facebook are the modern equivalents of the “town square,” and if one wants to ensure the speech is able to get its meaning
across, then private social media platforms must be treated as public forums.
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searches through its Robots Exclusion Standard, WeChat’s repeated selective blocks of competitors
like Didi, Taobao, Jinri Toutiao, and TikTok, or Baidu’s large scale diversion of searches to its own
site while not even displaying outside websites in search results, all go against the original spirt of the
Internet.

Data Ownership: An Analysis of Legal Clauses and Doctrines
Which one of the four views on data ownership makes the most sense? In order to answer this
question, we must first analyze the delineation of the individual right to data and the corporate right
to data from the perspectives of legal clauses and tenets. This analysis will demonstrate that the
delineation between the two is not at all clear.
The Individual’s Data Rights
First, the scope of personal data and personal data rights are both uncertain, resulting in the scope
of protected platform data to also be similarly uncertain. Originally, the laws of China and other
countries provided for the protection of personal data. Companies, societies, and governments all
had a common understanding of the priority of personal data protection. For instance, in the cases of
data disputes between Tencent and Huawei, Cainiao and Shunfeng, and Jinri Toutiao and Weibo all
parties saw personal data protection as of the utmost importance and emphasized the importance of
obtaining user authorizations, but the problem lies in whether the different sorts of data produced by
users on platforms can be considered as personal data. Should personal data receive the same level of
protection in all different application contexts?
According to the prevailing definition of personal data or individual information, both are
data that have been or can be discerned as individual (Schwartz & Solove, 2011, pp. 1814-1815).
For instance, the Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that individual
information refers to “all kinds of information, stored in electronic or other form, which individually
or in combination with other information allows the identification of a natural person’s individual
identity.” The EU’s “General Data Protection Regulation” defines personal data as “any information
concerning an identified or identifiable natural person.” According to this prevailing definition
however, different categories of data produced by users on web-platforms can possibly be considered
personal data or not personal data. This is because the platform’s user data have the potential to
directly or, in combination with other information, identify an individual, or can essentially have
no use in identifying the individual. Whether the individual can be identified is determined largely
by the specific application context, the subject being identified, and the identification’s degree of
difficulty. To take user comment data as an example, this sort of data displayed anonymously on a
platform would render it difficult to identify the associated individual for the average person, but if
this data was viewed in combination with information such as the respective user’s purchase history
and tracking history, this data would possibly be able to be used to identify the individual person, and
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to the user’s close associates, perhaps only one comment would be enough to identify the individual.
Besides this, the boundaries of the individual right to data are also uncertain, and it is difficult
for individuals to establish an exclusive right to their own data. A major contributor to thought on
data privacy, Alan Westin, once defined data or information privacy more broadly as control over
information (Westin, 1967, pp. 7). ① This framework was accepted by the legislatures of various
countries and regions and forms the foundational reasoning behind these jurisdiction’s data privacy
laws (Ding, 2019, pp. 96-110), but the problem lies in the fact that there are enormous differences in
how the law confers these data rights in different countries, regions, and contexts. The law may confer
rights such as the right to access and data security rights (Cate, 1997, pp. 370-373), and also possibly
newer rights described previously such as the right to be forgotten or the right to data portability (Ding,
2018, pp. 94-107). Whether it be among different countries or experts, consensus on this issue still has
not been achieved.
The uncertain characteristics of personal data make it difficult to draw a boundary between
individual and corporate data, or even render differentiations, which at first glance, seem relatively
clear, subject to doubt. For instance, in research on corporate data, much of the research classifies
data as either original or processed data, with original data commonly including personal data and
processed data not being personal data, due to having undergone the processing and demarcation
process. An example of this is data based on summed up personal data, which people commonly do
not consider as personal data, and whose ownership is seen as belonging to the corporation. This sort
of differentiation, however, still faces some challenges. If the right to delete data is conferred and an
individual requires the thorough deletion of their personal data, or an individual clearly requires that
any handling of their data be rescinded, then corporations will face controversy over processed or
summarized data based on original data. ②
The Platform’s Data Rights
In regard to the platform’s right to data, contrasting the legal protections provided to corporate
data by various countries leads one to realize that there are still many controversies in this area, and
that there is no commonly recognized legal boundary in terms of a platform’s data rights.
First, it is difficult to delineate the platform’s data rights through existing legal protections of
databases and intellectual property rights. In terms of substance, platform data are most akin to
a database in that both are the agglomeration of a large amount of data. In the case of databases
however, countries have vastly diverse views when it comes to their legal status. The database
protections of the US touch upon the key elements involved in the original compilation of the data and

① Westin believes that privacy is “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others.”
② This is not to say that I support the EU’s right to erasure or right to refuse handling in respect to data. In my view, although the individual has the right to
require that companies delete data or to refuse the handling of that data by a company in certain contexts, such rights should not obstruct statistical use (or
such similar uses) or personal data.
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offer no protection to the actual data contained within. In the case of Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., Feist copied the entire contents of a phonebook, which had been compiled by
Rural Telephone Service Co, without their authorization. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that this behavior was not in violation of copyright because copyright only protects the original
compilation of data and not the unoriginal content held within. Europe, taking a different approach
than that of the US, not only protects the original compilation portion but also provides protection
to databases in the form of sui generis rights. According to the stipulations of these sui generis rights,
when “creating a database requires enough manpower, technical, and financial resources” the
database is legally protected. Once the database has been created, others cannot use or copy either the
entirety or majority of the data contained within the database.
One of the reasons intellectual property rights and other related laws have different views on the
rights associated with databases is that data have so many attributes. On one hand, database creators
undoubtedly expend much labor through the process of collecting and arranging data. From the
perspective of classical labor theory of property (Locke, 1982, pp. 20-25), databases ought to receive
the protections guaranteed by property rights, or at least some approximation of those protections.
Historically, in the US, lower courts have acknowledged the so-called “sweat of the brow” and
“industrious collection” doctrines, which hold that if a large amount of labor is expended in collecting
data when producing a database, it should then receive legal protection. On the other hand, data have
a strong public character, and data themselves should not be considered legally recognized private
or intellectual property solely because there has been labor expended towards its end. Because
data, when compared with other movable and immovable property, is obviously neither exclusive
nor competitive in character, it is hard for data to be exclusively owned by an individual, especially
considering that public use of data does not result in their deterioration. The Supreme Court of the
United States clearly rejected the “sweat of the brow” doctrine put forward by the lower courts and
emphasized that copyright only applies to portions involving creativity and that data themselves
should be maintained as publicly owned. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that if the legal protections
afforded to databases were extended to the data that they contained, this would “distort basic
copyright principles.”
Furthermore, Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China provides no help in determining
the boundaries of the platform’s right to data. Whether Robots Exclusion Standard can be seen as
contractually binding is a matter of much controversy among the different judiciaries and legal
doctrines of various countries. Robots Exclusion Standard can be seen as an expression similar to a
contract, in that they communicate the wishes of an involved party to others, but does the act of the
web crawler simply reading the agreement constitute the establishment of a contract? In practice,
various countries have come to different judgments in regard to this sort of unilateral notification
contract. For instance, in the case of standard form contracts within software installation packages or
so-called “shrink-wrap licenses,” some courts have held that once a presumed consumer having been
able to see this sort of notification chooses to continue downloading the software, it is at that moment
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that the unilateral notification can be considered a contract. In the judgments of other courts however,
it has been held that this sort of contract is null and void.
In substance, Robots Exclusion Standard is not unlike signs found hanging inside the premises
of many small Chinese retailers that read “Competitors Need Not Enter” or such and such a person
“Need Not Enter.” Private law does not give a clear answer to the question of whether these sorts of
notifications can be considered contractually binding. On one hand, this sort of notice is reasonable
to a certain degree as it conforms to the party autonomy principle by clearly indicating the store’s
wishes. On the other hand, however, this sort of notice could be considered null and void ab initio.
When this type of notice is targeted at a specific group, it can be deemed as null and void for being
against public order and good morals, or could also be considered null and void for violating the antidiscrimination principle of public law (Ding, 2014, pp. 1080-1096). ① Besides this, even if this sort
of notice was contractually binding, it does not necessarily mean that the person seeing it accepts the
contract therein, they could simply see it as a friendly, non-binding reminder, meaning that entering
the store would not be equal to the establishment of a contract.
Furthermore, from the perspective of tort and criminal law, there is no clear standard for whether
violating a Robots Exclusion Standard can be considered as infringement of rights or as a trespass
of a computer system. Tort liability is generally established by four major factors, those being duty,
breach of duty, causation, and injury. In the case of data crawling, however, it is difficult to establish
that injury has taken place. In the majority of cases, web-crawling between web platforms is sustained
and occurs over long periods of time and neither overwhelms the site traffic of the crawled site nor
causes the site’s Internet speed to decrease. According to the concept of trespass in common law and
the crime of illegal seizure of computer system data in the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic
of China, ② whether data crawling is considered an illegal trespass of a computer system is itself
determined by how the law defines the nature of data crawling.
Professor Kerr once systematically analyzed the question of illegal trespass on the Internet by
comparing offline and online circumstances. Professor Kerr likened the technical anti-crawling
obstacles (such as Robots Exclusion Standard, authentication codes, passwords) set up by Internetbased companies to physical barriers (signs set up by storefronts, fences, closed doors, locked doors)
in the offline world. Professor Kerr pointed out that in the case of both the physical barriers and
technical barriers, the law offers no standard guide for whether such barriers may be crossed or the
boundaries of illegal trespass. As professor Kerr said, “Like their physical-world cousins, computer
trespass laws feature unilluminating text. They prohibit unauthorized access to computers just like
physical trespass laws prohibit unlicensed entry to physical spaces.” Whether in the physical world or
① Once this sort of discrimination touches upon a factor of identity, it may be in violation of various countries’ anti-discrimination regulations and principles.
② Article 285 Clause 2 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China describes the crime of illegal acquisition of computer information system
data. This crime stipulates that “whoever, in violation of the state provisions, intrudes into a computer information system other than that prescribed in the
preceding paragraph (state affairs, national defense construction, or sophisticated science and technology) or uses other technical means to obtain the data
stored, processed or transmitted in the said computer information system or exercise illegal control over the said computer information system shall, if the
circumstances are serious receive criminal punishment”.

145

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.6. 2020

the online world, “the meaning of the law must draw from social understandings about access rights
drawn from different signals within the relevant spaces. Courts must identify the rules of different
spaces based on understandings of the relevant trespass norms.”
Finally, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China also faces similar
problems in addressing this issue. Many recent Internet data disputes in China quote the second article
of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China which concerns stipulations on
business ethics. ① For instance, in the cases of both Sina vs. Maimai and Dianping vs. Baidu, courts
cited data crawling as violating business ethics and constituting unfair competition in the reasoning
behind their judgments. It must be indicated, however, that the judgments of these courts are mainly
established on the basis of these particular cases and an assessment of their specific circumstances.
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China itself gives no rigid framework
rules for what constitutes business ethics. As stated by many experts, laws against unfair competition
must rely on other legal provisions and business norms to determine what can be considered business
ethics, and that there often exists a high degree of inherent uncertainty within this area of law (Feldman,
2006, p. 197).

Data Ownership: A Pragmatic Analysis of Consequences
If legal clauses and tenets cannot provide a clear answer regarding the issue of data ownership,
then can an analysis of consequences based on pragmatism establish the right to data ownership? In
combination with the four views of data ownership summarized previously, it can be observed that it
is difficult to establish any of the four views as wholly correct or reasonable.
First, allocating the right to data solely to the individual is unrealistic and would produce
extraordinarily high transaction and communication costs. If the individual has an absolute property
right to data, then, that would mean that platforms or other individuals would have to receive personal
approval to access this sort of data. Under this sort of system, normal web crawling behavior such
as that done by search engines would be unimplementable, and even the reading of personal data by
other individuals would be in violation of the law (Ding, 2018, pp. 194-206). Besides this, determining
that individuals have the sole right to data would make certain rights the platform enjoys in respect
to the data impracticable, and would render platforms unable to undertake certain normal business
activities or even be guilty of infringing on the information of citizens. For example, platforms would
be unable to enter into exclusive user agreements with users such as Internet celebrities; Renren’s sale
of its website would not only constitute an illegal commercial activity but could also constituted an
infringement on the information of citizens. ①
① Article 2 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates: Businesses shall, in their production and distribution activities,
adhere to the free will, equality, fairness, and good faith principles, and abide by laws and business ethics. For the purposes of this Law, “act of unfair
competition” means that in its production or distribution activities, a business disrupts the order of market competition and causes damage to the lawful
rights and interests of the other businesses or consumers, in violation of this Law. “Operator” in this Law refers to a natural person, a legal person or an
unincorporated organization engaged in production and marketing of goods (“Goods” include services when used hereinafter) or provision of services.
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Second, allocating the right to data solely to the platform would go against common sense.
Platform data ownership would not only negatively impact the individual’s copyright or other
intellectual property rights but would also possibly make it impossible to protect citizens’ data privacy.
Even if the data are found on the Internet, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they can be arbitrarily
used by a third-party platform. The most well-known example of this sort of issue is the FacebookCambridge Analytica scandal, in which Cambridge Analytica collected the user information of three
hundred thousand users through an app and received the information of fifty million users from this
group of three hundred thousand users’ friends lists with Facebook’s authorization. Although all of
this information is publicly available online, its public availability obviously has a specially designated
target and context. Cambridge Analytica’s collection of these information without user authorization,
as well as its use of these information in a context completely separate from its intended one,
constituted an invasion of user data privacy.
Furthermore, allocating ownership to both the individual and the platform would create issues
preventing the circulation and sharing of data. As discussed previously, when a platform trades data
or shares it with another party, it can often be difficult to obtain user approvals in such circumstances.
In the same way, when a normal user who wishes to transfer his or her personal data and must obtain
the authorization of the platform, the transfer becomes difficult because many platforms may not
want to see users leave, this being the attitude expressed in Weibo’s user agreement. In summary,
combined platform and individual ownership of data would further increase the systemic costs of data
circulation and sharing.
Finally, while recognizing data as a public good may promote data circulation and sharing, it
renders protecting the individual right to data as well as the rational data interests of platforms an
impossible task. In the case of individuals, the public and connected nature of the Internet does not
mean that there are no privacy issues associated with publicly available personal data, nor does it
mean that this sort of data can be seen purely as a public good. In certain contexts, personal data
can bring with it a series of privacy issues or can even be a product of an individual’s digital labor,
combining the labor and output of an individual. On the other hand, platforms often invest large
amounts of capital and labor into both developing the platform itself and the process of collecting
data. A system with absolutely no protection for the legitimate data interests of corporations would
essentially allow for what in economics is referred to as “free-ride” behavior, in which it is difficult to
protect and promote investment and market competition (Tamaroff, 2011, p. 16).
No matter to which party data ownership is allocated, there will always be issues. The deep-seated
① Article 253A of the “Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China” stipulates: “(Where one is) in violation of the relevant state provisions, sells or illegally provides
personal information on citizens, shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention
in addition to a fine or be sentenced to a fine only; if the circumstances are especially serious, (the offender) shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than three
years but not more than seven years in addition to a fine.” The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues
concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases of Infringing on Citizens’ Personal Information further provides that “whoever provides any
citizen’s personal information legally collected to any other person without the consent of the person whose information is collected shall fall within the scope of
‘providing citizens’ personal information’ as prescribed in Article 253A of the Criminal Law.” This interpretation also stipulates that illegal acquisition and sale of
over five thousand articles of citizen’s personal information shall constitute “serious circumstances” mentioned above.
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reason for this lies in the fact that the nature of data is often highly reliant on its specific context.
Data are not like a normal object. A normal object’s basic character does not change depending on
its context and is still protected by real or property rights regardless of context, even though it may
manifest completely different characteristics in different contexts. One set of data could be classified
into different categories of data depending on the context and the target audience. Take social media
user data as an example, this sort of user data can undoubtedly be considered public data to the user’s
friends on the platform because the intention behind this sort of data is that it be disseminated among
this group. In the case of platforms and third-party corporations, however, this sort of user data is
protected by data privacy, because it includes a large amount of information that could be used to
identify an individual. Besides this, in the case of third-party platform competitors, an accumulation
of this data can be viewed as constituting a database, or as needing some sort of legal protection.
Because this sort of data has an extremely high commercial value, platforms invest large amounts of
capital and expend much labor in service of it.

Contextualizing Data Ownership
Contextual Protection of Data Rights and Interests
The issue of data ownership relies heavily on context. This means that protecting the rights and
interests of individuals and corporations in regard to data requires a contextual protection approach.
Determining the category and nature of data within specific contexts, and further determining
the data rights and interests of related parties based on each party’s reasonable expectations in that
specific context is a better approach to resolving data ownership disputes.
Contextual protection of personal data has already been well received by many scholars within
data privacy research. For instance, the celebrated scholar of privacy context theory, Professor
Helen Nissenbaum, once indicated that the fundamental principle of data privacy protection lies
in maintaining the contextual integrity of data (Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 127). In other words, the
reasonable circulation of personal data and information in certain contexts must be achieved
(Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 140). The reason Nissenbuam’s theory is so influential is that its concept of
“respect for context” became the guiding intellectual framework behind the “Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights” drafted during the Obama Administration. The most important reason for this is that this
theory accords with the fundamental characteristics of personal data protection. Another example is
the privacy categorization theory of Daniel J. Solove, an authority on data privacy. Solove borrowed
from Wittgenstein’s context principle to point out that privacy has no central or inherent characteristic
and that therefore protecting privacy in practice lies in ensuring that individual rights and interests are
not infringed in specific contexts ( Solove, 2002, p. 1087). Besides this, Professor Ari Ezra Waldman
once asserted that one cannot understand privacy in relation to personal information or data solely
from the perspective of individual rights, as the heart of the issue of privacy lies in trust (Waldman,
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2015, pp. 559, 560, 590), and therefore the boundaries of the right to privacy must be determined
according to reasonable expectations within a specific context (Waldman, 2015, pp. 590-630).
In practice, personal data protection does in fact apply the contextual protection approach. In the
US, there is little legislation addressing personal data protection at the federal level,① although the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has gradually established relevant regulations through enforcement
in specific cases (Solove, 2014, pp. 583, 585, 586). This method of protection is undoubtedly highly
contextual, to the point where some scholars summarize this method as common law’s protection
model. In Europe, even though laws such as the GPDR have established many regulatory systems
addressing data protection, these systems in reality overlap, and there are many areas where they
contradict each other. Additionally, these regulations are often subject to the constraints of legal
principles (Ding, 2018, pp. 39-53). Therefore, even if Europe adopted a unified legislative model, this
legislation has yet to establish clear boundaries in regard to personal data protection. Personal data
protection’s future orientation in the EU will still largely be determined by the regulatory evolution
based on specific contexts and cases.
Viewing personal data protection from a contextual perspective makes solving difficult issues
relating to data ownership much easier. For example, take the cases of the Facebook-Cambridge
Analytica scandal and the sale of Renren Network. Without a contextual approach, it is difficult to
explain why Cambridge Analytica’s use of certain user’s personal data became a scandal and Renren
Network’s transfer of data control did not incite much controversy at all. When taking a contextual
view of personal data protection, it becomes much easier to understand the differences between
the two cases. In the case of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, the use of certain personal data
damaged the legitimate expectations of individuals, and this use occurred without the consent of those
individuals, thereby violating user privacy. In contrast, Renren Network also did not obtain users’
consent prior to its sale, but the sale of Renren Network in no way changed the context or expectations
surrounding the use of that personal data. Thus, even if the sale changed who controls that data, it
did not constitute a threat to data privacy. ② As long as the purchasers of Renren Network take on
the responsibility of protecting personal data and use platform data in the context of the individual’s
legitimate expectations, personal data privacy will still be reasonably protected (Balkin, 2016, p.
1183). ③
The contextual protection approach is also more suited to the protection of corporate and platform
data rights and interests. In judicial practice with respect to data crawling disputes, there have been
differences in legal bases cited by Chinese and American authorities. Chinese courts more often
utilized competition law to protect platform data, whereas courts in the US tended to appeal to
① The federal legislation of the US on data privacy has taken a sectoral approach, which is mainly concentrated in high data risk areas such as medicine,
education, and fields involving minors.
② Of course, Renren Network would probably need to notify users of the change in ownership in order to guarantee that they are aware of their rights. Article 13
of the EU’s “General Data Protection Regulation” stipulates that when personal data relating to a data subject is collected from the data subject, the controller
must provide the data subject with “the identity and the contact details of the controller and, where applicable, of the controller’s representative.”
③ From the perspective of legal responsibilities, this sort of responsibility is more akin to a fiduciary responsibility than a contractual one.
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trespass as existing in common law and other legislation. Both the US and China have similarities
in the contextual nature of their protections. The protection mechanism of Chinese competition law
emphasizes individual case judgments and reasoning through analogy, establishing guidelines based
on the specifics of each case, and not seeking legal answers through a unified set of guidelines.
Furthermore, the concept of trespass in the US law is also highly dependent on context. What can
be considered trespass and what can be considered reasonable access and use is determined by the
specific context and various different factors within the specific case.
In terms of legal theory, applying contextual protection to data ownership uses the rule of reason
and not rule per se to make judgments on issues of data rights. In regard to legal disputes, traditional
legal domains generally emphasize the importance of legal regulations and mainly establish the
boundaries of different parties’ rights through regulations and their exceptions. In the legal domains
of competition law and anti-monopoly law, however, foreign laws tend to use the rule of reason to
determine parties’ rights within each case. This method is often used to determine the rights and
obligations of various parties because of the context-specific nature of this category of disputes, which
makes it difficult to rely on other less context reliant regulations. Because of the highly contextual
nature of data, applying the rule of reason will undoubtedly be more beneficial to carrying out more
reasonable protection of personal and corporate data. ①
Factors of Data Ownership Determination
In the judgments of actual cases, there are a series of factors that must be considered in
determining the contextual ownership of platform data. Firstly, data privacy protection must be a
factor for consideration of paramount importance. In circumstances where data privacy would cause
substantial risk to the individual or damage the individual’s legitimate expectations, the priority
of data privacy protection relative to corporate rights and interests in regard to data should be
maintained. This is because once personal data are not reasonably protected, not only will legal rights
and interests of individuals be endangered, but corporations themselves will lose the confidence from
users and consumers.②
Secondly, one must focus on facilitating data sharing and interconnectedness while respecting the
premise of guaranteeing personal data privacy. The sharing and circulation of data in no way harm
data, but actually make returns to scale from data’s use, more likely, enabling “big data” to fulfill its
potential and provide a stable foundation for the artificial intelligence industry. After all, the main
characteristics of “big data” are “high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety information assets,”

① It needs to be remarked that the contextual determination of platform data ownership does not resolve the issue of data ownership entirely. As a legal model
and concept, the question of ownership will be ever-present in any issue that involves property-like profit. As data’s value becomes more apparent by the day,
one can imagine that data ownership disputes will become ever more prominent and that parties involved in the use and collection of data will increasingly use
the frameworks and concepts of ownership to advocate their positions. In this sense, I neither seek to nor am I able to completely resolve the question of data
ownership itself, but rather reconstruct and consider approaches to deal with the question.
② Under the condition that the platform’s use of personal data will not result in risk or damage to legitimate expectations, then it is not advantageous to put too
many restrictions on the reasonable collection of personal data, and personal data rights of all kinds should be expanded.
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and without the sharing and circulation of data the development of big data and artificial intelligence
will be left without fertile ground in which to prosper.
Thirdly, factors such as the nature of the platform carrying out web-crawling operations and the
platform being crawled as well as the nature of the crawling behavior itself should be considered
when determining the boundaries of unfair competition and reasonable use. In terms of the party
carrying out the crawling, when that party serves the public welfare or could be considered a public
utility, that party should be allowed to engage in data crawling behaviors. For example, in the case of
search engines, both the US and Europe have adopted a relatively open attitude towards search engine
data. Even in cases where web-crawling affects information and data protected by copyright, it has
generally been regarded that the web-crawling carried out by search engines is within the scope of
reasonable use. Because search engines are akin to a public utility in nature, there is no doubt that the
web-crawling they engage in is beneficial to the public dissemination and use of data. ①
In terms of the party that is the subject of web-crawling, one should consider both the dimensions
and character of that platform’s data. When the crawled party has a large amount of data that can
be considered original data or fundamental data, reasonable use of such data by third parties should
be permitted more often. This is because when an extremely large web platform amasses a large
quantity of data, the possibility of the monopolization of this data emerges. If this sort of platform is
granted data protections that are too strong, the result could be the emergence of some sort of “digital
fragmentation” or “digital feudalism,” in which it is difficult to ensure data sharing and inclusivity. In
the case of databases, this sort of issue has already emerged. In the US and Europe, a few academic
database giants have an essential monopoly over academic papers, and if one wants to read these
papers, one must pay a large amount of fees (Lim, 2006). In China, the effective monopoly over
academic content possessed by the Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI, a large
Chinese periodical database) has attracted much criticism. If overall open availability and orderly
circulation of data resources cannot be maintained, then small and medium sized enterprises will face
problems of data barriers, and it will be difficult for effective competition to form in online spaces.
In terms of the nature of web-crawling, all other factors held the same, when a platform uses
data obtained through crawling to engage in a similar commercial context with the platform that has
been crawled, at this point, the crawling behavior should tend towards being deemed as an unfair
competition. However, when the goal of the data crawling is to further process the data acquired
or use them in a different context, the law should err on the side of recognizing the behavior as
constituting reasonable use. This is because there is no creative use in the former behavior and no
differentiated service has been provided to consumers. This sort of data crawling completely qualifies
as “a free ride,” in which it does nothing to facilitate a healthy competitive market environment. In
contrast, although the second sort of data crawling behavior does have some “ride-hitching” elements,
① Of course, search engines’ status as public utilities should entail that they take on more public responsibilities in many cases. For instance, they should provide
the public with impartial information. Once search engine companies lose their public character and close themselves off, they should lose their right to
reasonable data crawling and data use.
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but considering the strong public nature of data as well as the creativity and differentiated service
that arise as a result of the behavior. This instance should be considered as a reasonable use of data or
should at the very least be more cautiously determined to be unfair competition.
Of course, when determining whether data crawling constitutes unfair competition or reasonable
use, one must consider factors well beyond those described above. For instance, one must have a
legitimate expectation that combines the common business practices of the given context and industry
norms. These various and diverse factors involved in these determinations undoubtedly increase
the difficulty while coming to judicial and legal judgments. However, from another perspective,
the comprehensive analysis of these various factors will provide a more comprehensive and holistic
judicial analysis of this issue and in the end, a more complete set of legal interpretations (Dworkin,
1986, pp. 176-275).

Conclusion
There are four major viewpoints in regard to the data ownership issues that arise as a result of
data crawling: Platform data are owned solely by an individual, platform data belong solely to a
platform itself, platform data belong to both the individual and the platform, and platform data are
publicly owned. However, the research presented here indicate that analysis from both the perspective
of legal clauses and the perspective of legal doctrines fails to support any of these four viewpoints. A
consequentialist analysis also revealed that any of these allocations of data ownership is unreasonable.
The reason platform data’s ownership is impossible to clearly delineate lies in the multiple
characteristics of data, and their characteristics often rely on a specific context. In some contexts,
platform data are the domain of the individual, and the protection provided by data privacy laws takes
precedence, while in other contexts, platform data are akin to the nature of a database, and should
be protected akin to the protection granted to a database, in still other contexts platform data have a
public character and require that their circulation and shared use should be legally guaranteed.
The complex and highly contextual nature of data requires the establishment of contextual
protections and assurances for data. Whether it be protection of individual rights to data or the
legitimate protection of the data rights and interests of corporations, it is important to emphasize
that reforms and legal progress occur in a bottom-up manner on a case-by-case basis and not to rely
too heavily on a top-down regulatory framework. In terms of legal theories, this means that data
rights should be determined by the rule of reason and not through some sort of universally applicable
regulatory arrangements.
At the level of actual judgments, many different factors must be considered when determining the
ownership of platform data. One must consider the priority protection of data privacy, the legitimate
protection of the platform’s rights and interests concerning data, and especially consider facilitating
the circulation and sharing of data. One must consider avoiding “free-ride” behaviors in the area
of data, as well as the public character of data. One must avoid unreasonable competition, data
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monopolies, and data barriers. It is only if all of these elements are considered that the Internet can
facilitate the reasonable circulation and protection of data, from which we will all benefit.
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